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ABSTRACT
This paper investigates the antivirus market from the perspective of social welfare and market efficiency. It analyzes the
uncertainty characteristic of virus attacks and the moral hazard problem from the antivirus software vendor. It also proposes
one potential solution, that is, antivirus contracting between IT users and the antivirus software vendor, to reduces the
transaction cost and alleviate the moral hazard problem in the antivirus market.
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INTRODUCTION
Computer viruses are software that can damage or destroy data, software or hardware in a computer or network (Turban,
Mclean and Wetherbe 2004). Virus is a dominant threat (78% reported) to IT users compared with other threats such as
employees abuse of Internet access (59%), labtop/mobile theft (49%) and systems penetration (39%) (2004 Computer Crime
and Security Survey). Chen and Robert (2004) show that emerging high speed network would likely accelerate the spread of
malware including viruses and worms. The costs incurred by viruses are huge. The estimated costs of several virus outbreaks
are as follows: Melissa in 1999: $80 Million; ILOVEYOU in 1999: $2.6 Billion and SIRCAM in 2001: $1.5 Billion (Trend
Micro 2002). In addition to these direct costs, antivirus software vendors have to invest money to develop antivirus software,
and IT users have to invest heavily to fight virus attacks. These efforts actually are not directly related to increasing the
productivity, and the overall social costs from viruses and antivirus campaign are quite substantial.
Although currently we do not have any effective ways to control the virus-writer’s behavior, we need to think about what the
antivirus software vendors can do to prevent virus attacks, or once virus attacks happen, to minimize the costs. Most of
researches on virus and antivirus focus on technical issues. So far as we know, little research has been conducted from the
perspective of social welfare and market efficiency. In this paper, we try to answer the following questions: While we are
blaming notorious virus-writers for ruining our business, what is the negative role (moral hazard) that the market participants
play in virus attacks and antivirus campaign? Can we align their behavior in the antivirus market so that we can achieve
higher level of information security, better social welfare and higher market efficiency?
UNCERTAINTY CHARACTERISTIC OF VIRUS ATTACKS
In the antivirus software market, information is asymmetric, hence uncertainty problem arises. The number, type and arrival
time of incoming viruses are random variables to both the IT user and the antivirus software vendor. Even if the IT user has
the latest versions of antivirus software, use some decision making method to choose the antivirus (Magmaghani 2002) or use
automatic signature files (Badhusha et al. 2001), it cannot guarantee that this arrangement is effective or reliable to defend all
incoming viruses. Generally, antivirus software purchase can be divided into ex ante purchase and ex post purchase. For ex
ante purchase, IT users need to forecast or predict any potential virus threats and choose the right antivirus software. For ex
post purchase, IT users have already known the existence of current viruses, and try to buy appropriate antivirus software to
defend, repair or restore their information systems. The IT user has to keep buying new versions of antivirus software or
other antivirus alternatives, which cost extra money. Cooley (2003) points out that the “accuracy”, that is, how good the
solution is at catching viruses, is the first major factor that IT users considers in examining and selecting a network virus
protection solution. For the antivirus software vendor, it is very difficult for him to predict what kind of viruses will come up
as well. He may develop some function which might never be used. For example, Bontchev (1996) shows that the illusion
that macro virus have to depend on the auto macros in order to replicate among antivirus software vendors is wrong. Based
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on this illusion, some vendors have developed inadequate antivirus products. Norton Antivirus fails to alarm the presence of
the Nimda virus in InstallShield (Swanson 2001). From the viewpoint of the society, ex ante antivirus software development
and purchase should lead to a waste of our resources.
MORAL HAZARD PROBLEM IN ANTIVIRUS SOFTWARE MARKET
Moral hazard is "the tendency whereby people expend less effort protecting those goods which are insured against theft or
damage" (Frank 1991). From Varian (1990), "Moral Hazard refers to situations where one side of the market can't observe
the actions of the other. For this reason it is sometimes called a hidden action problem." See more discussion on moral hazard
in Molho (1997). One moral hazard problem in the antivirus software market is that the antivirus software vendor might not
develop or release the antivirus software on time. In addition, the antivirus software vendor might tolerate or expect more
viruses invented. The reason is that many IT users will not buy any antivirus software until he has suffered some costs or he
feels some threats from potential virus attacks. Post and Kagan (1998) show that most organizations wait until they suffer a
substantial attack by virus before they implement antivirus solutions.  They conclude, “It appears that the shock of a virus
episode is needed to force management to commit and allocate the funds to prevent further attacks.” Therefore, the antivirus
software vendor might purposely delay releasing the new antivirus software for the new virus until it is rampant and has
brought large costs to the society. The process can be described as follows. Suppose the probability of IT users buying the
antivirus software is ( )p c , where c  is the cost incurred from the virus attacks and 0dp
dc
> . We also know ( , )c c t v= , where









expected revenue of the antivirus software vendor is p priceπ = × , where “price” refers to the price of antivirus software. It






> , which suggest that the antivirus software vendor has an incentive to delay the launch of
new antivirus software, and expects more serious viruses to show up so that more IT users have to buy his antivirus software.
Given competition in the antivirus software market, the antivirus software vendor might not release his antivirus software
very late. However, it is clear that the antivirus software vendor has the tendency to prolong the release of antivirus software
until IT users have incurred some cost or realized the importance of antivirus. The even worse moral hazard is that, the
antivirus software vendor has an incentive to collude with hackers to release some viruses to threat the IT users. At least, we
can not exclude the possibility that the antivirus software vendor collude with the hackers as Trend Micro (2002) points out
that virus writer are driven by many factors including money. It is evident that the number of viruses increases rapidly in
recent years. According to Cert Coordination Center, the number of virus incidents is more than double every year. 9,859
virus incidents were reported in 1999; 21,756 in 2000; 52,658 in 2001; and 82,094 in 2002 (Trend Micro 2004). No research
has been conducted to investigate why many viruses are so rampant and why virus writers have so such enthusiasm to create
viruses. Ironically, the antivirus software industry is booming as viruses are rampant. Keizer (2003) reports that the cloud of
August’s viruses and worms heat the antivirus software market. IDC forecasts that the antivirus software business will get
even bigger in the next five years. By 2007, total revenue will reach $4.4 billion, which double the revenue in 2002. Hulme
(2004) reports that the Internet security software vendor Symantec Corp recorded a revenue of $494 million for third quarter
in 2003, 31% higher than the $376 million in the same period in 2002.
ANTIVIRUS CONTRACTING ARRANGEMENT
In order to solve both virus attack uncertainty and moral hazard problem from the antivirus software vendor, we propose, that
both the antivirus software vendor and user sign a contract similar to an antivirus insurance. Under the contracting, IT users
buy antivirus software and warrantee from one antivirus software vendor and the vendor promises to supply effective update
antivirus software in the event where any new virus shows up. This alternative solution brings benefits to the both sides as IT
users do not need to repeatedly buy antivirus software, and the antivirus software vendor does not need to develop some
useless functions in his products. The antivirus contracting arrangement can reduce the moral hazard problem mentioned
previously. Under the contracting, the antivirus software vendor has liability to crack any virus attacks, and this endeavor
costs the vendor. First, the antivirus software vendor will not choose to develop and release antivirus software quite late
because he will incur more costs; second, it is less likely that the antivirus software and hacker collude in this setting, because
the antivirus software vendor is an agent of IT users, and any attack on IT users is equivalent to an attack on the antivirus
software vendor (see principal-agent theory in Laffont and Martimort 2002).   In this new arrangement, the antivirus software
vendor is more likely active, not passive, against any virus attacks.
Let us see how to implement such antivirus contracting arrangement. We use the game theoretical approach. Suppose we
have antivirus software vendors A and B, and one antivirus software user C. C can either buy antivirus software from A with
antivirus insurance or buy antivirus software from B. If C buys from A, A can choose either to keep its promise or break his
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promise. For simplicity, we assume some reasonable payoffs to A, B and C under different strategy profiles. The game can be
described in the extensive form in Figure 1 and in the normal form in Table 1.
Keep Promise Break Promise
Buy from A* 10, 5 3, 10
Buy from B** 4, -1 4, -1
Note: * B’s payoff is -1. ** B’s payoff is 3.
Table 1. Payoff Matrix of A and C
In this game, if we use backward induction, the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium is that A breaks his promise and C buys
antivirus software from B. The implication of this game is that the antivirus contracting might be difficult to implement as C
will choose not to buy from A in the game. However, if we assume A and C play this game repeatedly, we have a different
story. A knows that if he breaks the promise, C will switch to B. In an infinitely repeated game, suppose A chooses “Tit for
Tat” strategy, that is, A keeps promise in the first round, then keeps promise if C buys his product, and breaks his promise if
C does not buy from him. We suppose that C chooses “Grim” strategy, that is, C buys from A in the first round. He will buy
from A again if A keeps his promise and buy from B forever if A doesn’t keep his promise in the previous round. Let us see
the payoff of A and C. 5...)55(1 =++=
nA
π as ∞→n , and 10...)1010(1 =++=
nC
π as ∞→n . We claim that this (Tit
fir Tat, Grim) is a sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium.
Proposition 1: In an infinitely repeated game of antivirus contracting, if A plays “Tit for Tat” and C plays “Grim”, then the
strategy profile (Tit for Tat, Grim) is a sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium.
Proof: We know 1 (5 5 ...) 5A n
π = + + = and 1 (10 10 ...) 10C n
π = + + =  as ∞→n  under (Tit for Tat, Grim) strategy profile in
the infinitely repeated game. We will examine whether A has an incentive to deviate from “Keep Promise”. Once he deviates
from “Keep Promise”, C will not buy his antivirus software again, his payoff is 1 (5 .. 0 ...) 0A n
π = + + + =  as ∞→n . So,
A has no incentive to deviate from “Keep Promise”. Let us check whether C has an incentive to deviate from “Grim”. If he
does not always buys from A, his payoffs should be between 4 and 10, that is, 10 4Cπ> >  as ∞→n . Obviously, C has no
incentive to deviate from “Grim” strategy. The (Tit for Tat, Grim) profile is also sub-game perfect because it is a Nash
equilibrium in every sub-game. QED
Therefore, if the antivirus software vendor and user can sign a contract and be apt for repeated renewal through an antivirus
warranty, both sides have no incentive to deviate. This suggests that this alternative solution is not only effective and feasible
to both sides, but also efficient to our society because the total payoff is maximized (Total social payoff under antivirus
contracting 10+5-1=14 is greater than total payoff without antivirus contracting 4-1+3=6). We argue that as viruses become
more unpredictable and rampant and the moral hazard problem draws more attention, the antivirus contracting arrangement
should become popular.
SUMMARY AND FUTURE STUDY
This paper investigates the antivirus software market from the perspective of social welfare and market efficiency.
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contracting proposal between IT users and the antivirus software vendor to reduce the transaction costs and alleviate the
moral hazard problem. This study is in progress. Next, we will design a detailed market mechanism to implement the
antivirus contracting.
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